Financial Institutions, Contagious Risks, and Financial Crises by Huang, Haizhou & Xu, Chenggang
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial Institutions, Contagious Risks, and Financial Crises  
 
 
By: Haizhou Huang and Chenggang Xu 
 
 
William Davidson Working Paper Number 444 
November 2001  
 
Financial Institutions, Contagious Risks, and Financial Crises
1 
 
 
 
Haizhou Huang                                             Chenggang Xu 
        Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department        Department of Economics  
                 International Monetary Fund                      London School of Economics 
                        700 19
th Street, NW                                         Houghton Street 
               Washington, DC 20431, U.S.A.                        London WC2A 2AE, U.K. 
                            hhuang@imf.org                                             c.xu@lse.ac.uk  
 
 
First draft: October 1998; Revised: November 2001 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In this paper contagious risks and financial crises are endogenized through the 
interactions among corporations, banks, and the interbank market. We show that the lack of 
financial discipline in a single-bank-financing economy generates informational problems 
and thus the malfunction of the interbank market, which constitutes a mechanism of financial 
contagion and may lead to a financial crisis. In contrast, financial discipline in an economy 
with diversified financial institutions leads to timely information disclosure from firms to 
banks and improves the informational environment of the interbank market. With symmetric 
information in the interbank market, bank runs are contained to insolvent banks and financial 
crises are prevented. Our theory sheds light on the causes and timing of the East Asian crisis; 
it also has important policy implications for the lender of last resort and banking reform. 
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Non-Technical summary 
 
It has been documented that financial crises often accompany problems in financial 
institutions, probably even more so at some specific stages of development. The recent 
financial crisis in East Asia, as well as the major financial crises in Europe and America in 
the late 1920s and earlier, provide examples but and the recent Asian crisis also poses new 
challenges to economists and policy makers. For example, immediately before the crisis, the 
East Asian economies had been doing so well that there was a major debate among 
economists concerning the nature of the ``miracle.'' The eruption of the financial crisis in 
East Asia presents a major challenge to economists and policy makers. A particularly 
puzzling phenomenon regarding the crisis is derived from a comparison between Korea and 
Taiwan. Korea and Taiwan were both regarded as the major phenomenon of the so-called 
``East Asia Miracle.'' However, while Korea was at the center of the East Asian crisis, 
Taiwan was much less affected --- even though it too had been attacked by international 
speculators. Was this difference an accident? 
 
Our analysis of the functions of corporate and banking institutions will provide an answer to 
this puzzling phenomenon. Consistent with observations that the financial crisis in East Asia 
was deeply linked to corporate financial problems, our theory suggests that different 
financing structures in the various East Asian economies generated a profound impact on the 
information in their respective financial markets, which further affected financial stability. 
  
Our theory can be summarized as follows. Informational structures in two different kind of 
economies are endogenized. In an economy where corporations are financed by multiple 
banks or through a syndicated loan, the liquidation of bad projects/firms is a norm in the 
economy. The liquidation of bad projects makes information public so that banks have more 
knowledge about each another's assets and solvency. In the remainder of the paper, we term 
this kind of economy a multi-bank-finance (MBF) economy. 
  
In an economy where financing decisions of corporations are concentrated (e.g., the Japanese 
main-bank system or the Korean principal-transaction-bank system), however, the liquidation 
of bad projects/firms is an exception. Without the liquidation of bad projects, banks with bad 
projects can easily hide bad news from others. We show that in such an economy bad 
projects are not liquidated and thus the solvency of a financier is not known to other 
financiers. We call this kind of economy a single-bank-finance economy (SBF). 
  
In our model, an economy has many banks which receive deposits a la Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983) and invest in long-term projects with stochastic returns. Moreover, there is an 
interbank market which may solve liquidity shortage problems among banks. That is, when a 
bank faces a liquidity shock it may borrow from others in the market. The function of the 
interbank market depends on information about the asset quality of the borrowing bank. 
When an equilibrium is such that bad projects are liquidated (e.g., in MBF economy), which 
can be observed by other banks, the interbank market can function well and trading among 
banks can solve the liquidity problem faced by illiquid banks. 
    
 
However, if lending banks in the interbank market are unable to distinguish solvent from 
insolvent borrowing banks (e.g., in a SBF economy), i.e., there is a pooling equilibrium 
whereby all illiquid banks are treated in the same manner. In that case, asymmetric 
information among financiers will make the interbank lending market a ``lemon'' market. In 
this lemon market, all borrowing banks face the same nominal expected cost. This implies 
that solvent banks will have to subsidize the borrowing of insolvent banks. With private 
information about one's own solvency, a better-quality borrowing bank will face higher costs 
of borrowing due to this implicit subsidy. 
  
When a liquidity shock is severe, such high borrowing costs can lead a solvent bank to 
choose between liquidating assets or facing a bank run. Since bank managers have career 
concerns and from their perspective, a liquidation is worse than a bank run. As a result, 
illiquid banks with better-quality assets may not borrow and may face a bank run earlier than 
other banks. However, a bank run on better banks will deteriorate the quality of the lending 
market, thus triggering more bank runs. We further demonstrate bank run contagious risks 
can lead to the collapse of the lending market and a financial crisis, in particular when 
investment projects are heterogeneous in quality. 
  
We also show that a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market does not always lead to a 
financial crisis when there are only idiosyncratic shocks and the projects are homogeneous in 
quality. This is because the expected borrowing cost for good banks decreases monotonically 
with the average quality of the projects in the economy and the homogeneity of the quality of 
projects. If the average quality of the projects is high, and/or the projects are very 
homogeneous in quality, the interbank market works well and there is no bank run or 
financial crisis. But if the projects are heterogeneous and the average quality of the projects is 
not very high, a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market becomes an incubator for a 
financial crisis. 
  
This result has implications for the timing of a financial crisis in a pooling equilibrium 
economy. An economy should have no trouble when most of its sectors are similar, e.g., most 
projects are at similar imitation stages, but the situation will change when the projects are 
more heterogeneous, such as when the imitation stage of the economy has ended. 
  
One of our major contributions to the literature is to model the function and failure of the 
interbank market with the presence of both liquidity and technological shocks and imperfect 
information. We show that a certain type of financial institution (MBF) creates symmetric 
information in the interbank lending market; in that case bank runs are contained. We 
endogenize Akerlof's (1970) lemon problem and extend it from real markets to the liquidity 
market between lenders and borrowers. A contagious bank run in our model is the result of 
an interbank market failure due to informational problems, which are caused by a SBF 
institution. In a separate paper, we further extend our analysis of the liquidity management of 
banks in a model with an interbank market and liquidation of real assets. Another 
contribution is to provide a model to illustrate that a commitment mechanism to liquidate bad 
projects can make solvency information available to the market on a timely basis. 1. INTRODUCTION
It has been documented that …nancial crises often accompany problems in …nancial
institutions, probably even more so at some speci…c stages of development. The
recent …nancial crisis in East Asia, and the major …nancial crises in Europe and
America in the late 1920s and earlier, provide examples. This paper develops a
theory which endogenizes …nancial crises through institutions related to the corporate
sector, banks, and the interbank market. The basic idea is that di¤erent ways of
…nancing corporate investment projects may a¤ect the nature of bankruptcy in failing
projects. This in turn a¤ects information in the interbank market. For …nancial
institutions unable to commit to liquidate bad projects, there will be informational
problems between entrepreneurs and banks, which will cause informational problems
amongbanks in the interbank market. Severe informational problems inthe interbank
market can lead to a market failure, which constitutes a mechanism for …nancial
contagion and creates conditions for a …nancial crisis.
Our theory emphasizes the role of …nancial institutions in explaining …nancial
crises, in particular the 1997 East Asian …nancial crisis. Immediately before the
crisis, the East Asian economies had been doing so well that there was a major de-
bate among economists concerning the nature of the “miracle.” The eruption of
the …nancial crisis in East Asia presents a major challenge to economists and policy
makers. A particularly puzzling phenomenon regarding the crisis is derived from a
comparison between Korea and Taiwan. Korea and Taiwan were both regarded as
the major phenomenon of the so-called “East Asia Miracle.” However, while Korea
was at the center of the East Asian crisis, Taiwan was much less a¤ected — even
though it too had been attacked by international speculators.
Was this di¤erence an accident? Our analysis of the functions of corporate and
banking institutions will provide an answer to this puzzling phenomenon. Consistent
with observations that the …nancial crisis in East Asia was deeply linked to corporate
…nancial problems, our theory suggests that di¤erent …nancing structures in the var-
1ious East Asian economies generated a profound impact on the information in their
respective …nancial markets, which further a¤ected …nancial stability.
Our theory can be summarized as follows. Informational structures in two di¤erent
kind of economies are endogenized. In an economy where corporations are …nanced
by multiple banks or through a syndicated loan, the liquidation of bad projects/…rms
is a norm in the economy (see the model). The liquidation of bad projects makes
information public so that banks have more knowledge about each another’s assets
and solvency. In the remainder of the paper, we term this kind of economy a multi-
bank-…nance (MBF) economy.
In an economy where …nancing decisions of corporations are concentrated (e.g., the
Japanese main-bank system or the Korean principal-transaction-bank system), how-
ever, the liquidation of bad projects/…rms is an exception (see the model). Without
the liquidation of bad projects, banks with bad projects can easily hide bad news
from others. We show that in such an economy bad projects are not liquidated and
thus the solvency of a …nancier is not known to other …nanciers. In the remainder of
the paper, we call this kind of economy a single-bank-…nance economy (SBF).
In our model, an economy has many banks which receive deposits (à la Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983) and invest in long-term projects with stochastic returns. Moreover,
there is an interbank market which may solve liquidity shortage problems among
banks. That is, when a bank faces a liquidity shock it may borrow from others in
the market. The function of the interbank market depends on information about the
asset quality of the borrowing bank. When an equilibrium is such that bad projects
are liquidated (e.g., in MBF economy), which can be observed by other banks, the
interbank market can function well and trading among banks can solve the liquidity
problem faced by illiquid banks.
However, if lending banks in the interbank market are unable to distinguish solvent
from insolvent borrowing banks (e.g., in a SBF economy), i.e., there is a pooling
equilibrium whereby all illiquid banks are treated in the same manner. In that case,
asymmetric information among …nanciers will make the interbank lending market a
2“lemon” market. In this lemon market, all borrowing banks face the same nominal
expected cost. This implies that solvent banks will have to subsidize the borrowing of
insolvent banks. With private information about one’s own solvency, a better-quality
borrowing bank will face higher costs of borrowing due to this implicit subsidy.
When a liquidity shock is severe, such high borrowing costs can lead a solvent
bank to choose between liquidating assets or facing a bank run. We assume that a
liquidation implies poor management, while a well-managed bank can still experience
a bank run due to exogenous liquidity shocks. In addition, bank managers have career
concerns. Thus, from a bank manager’s perspective, a liquidation is worse than a
bank run. As a result, illiquid banks with better-quality assets may not borrow
and may face a bank run earlier than other banks. However, a bank run on better
banks will deteriorate the quality of the lending market, thus triggering more bank
runs. We further demonstrate bank run contagious risks can lead to the collapse of
the lending market and a …nancial crisis, in particular when investment projects are
heterogeneous in quality.
We also show that a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market does not always
lead to a …nancial crisis when there are only idiosyncratic shocks and the projects are
homogeneous in quality. This is because the expected borrowing cost for good banks
decreases monotonically with the average quality of the projects in the economy and
the homogeneity of the quality of projects. If the average quality of the projects is
high, and/or the projects are very homogeneous in quality, the interbank market
works well and there is no bank run or …nancial crisis. But if the projects are
heterogeneous and the average quality of the projects is not very high, a pooling
equilibrium in the interbank market becomes an incubator for a …nancial crisis.
This result has implications for the timing of a …nancial crisis in a pooling equi-
librium economy. An economy should have no trouble when most of its sectors are
similar, e.g., most projects are at similar imitation stages, but the situation will
change when the projects are more heterogeneous, such as when the imitation stage
of the economy has ended.
3One of our major contributions to the literature is to model the function and fail-
ure of the interbank market with the presence of both liquidity and technological
shocks and imperfect information.1 We show that a certain type of …nancial institu-
tion (MBF) creates symmetric information in the interbank lending market; in that
case bank runs are contained. We endogenize Akerlof’s (1970) lemon problem and
extend it from real markets to the liquidity market between lenders and borrowers. A
contagious bank run in our model is the result of an interbank market failure due to
informational problems, which are caused by a SBF institution. In a separate paper
(Huang and Xu, 2001), we further extend our analysis of the liquidity management
of banks in a model with an interbank market and liquidation of real assets.
Von Hayek (1945) outlined a principle according to which it is the market, rather
than the government, that provides the right information for the economy to operate
e¢ciently. However, what this means in the context of a …nancial crisis is unclear.
One of our major contributions is to provide a model to illustrate that a commitment
mechanism to liquidate bad projects can make solvency information available to the
market on a timely basis.
With respect to the recent literature on …nancial crisis, the works by Aghion,
Bolton, and Dewatripont (1999) and Allen and Gale (2000) are related to our work,
but their emphases are di¤erent from ours. Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont (1999)
focus on systemic shocks to the entire banking system. In comparison, we study a
mechanism of negative externalities in the interbank market that transforms idiosyn-
cratic shocks into a systemic liquidity shock, and thus bank failure contagion. Allen
and Gale (2000) derive …nancial contagion from the incompleteness of the structure
of interregional claims. If we reinterpret our interbank market as a form of inter-
connectedness among all the banks in their model, then we show that even with a
complete structure of interregional claims, informational problems in the market can
still lead to …nancial contagion.
1See Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Rochet and Tirole (1996) for contributions on modeling
the interbank market with liquidity trading.
4Finally, in the following we summarize our way of endogenizing pooling and sep-
arating equilibria in the interbank market. A …nancial system where key decisions
on project re…nancing are made by “multi banks” incurs higher costs of renegotia-
tion, hence liquidations are more likely to occur. That is, multi-bank …nancing can
be used as a commitment device to create a separating equilibrium. In contrast,
…nancial systems where key decisions are made by single banks do not face such high
renegotiation costs and thus are more likely to reorganize rather than to liquidate.
That is, the system is not able to commit to stopping bad projects, and therefore
good and bad projects are pooled together. Examples of such single-bank systems
include the main-bank system in Japan and the principal-transaction-bank system in
Korea.
To focus on our major points, we analyze two types of a “pure” economy: a SBF
economy in which only a pure pooling equilibrium exists, and a MBF economy in
which only a pure separating equilibrium exists. We also suppose that the choice
of a …nancial system in an economy depends on some exogenous reasons that make
multi-bank …nancing too costly, such as high costs to enforce contracts. The idea
to use multi-bank …nancing as a commitment device is inspired by Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995), Hart and Moore (1995), and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie‡y overviews …nan-
cial institutions in Korea and Taiwan. Section 3 establishes the basic structure of
the model and endogenizes information distributions between banks and corpora-
tions and in an interbank market. Section 4, in particular subsections 4.3 and 4.4,
investigates how a bank run contagion is created in a SBF economy and when it can
lead to a …nancial crisis. Finally, section 5 concludes with some quali…cations and
elaborations of our theory in relation to the existing literature, and a discussion of
policy implications.
52. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CORPORATE FINANCING IN
KOREA AND TAIWAN
Korea and Taiwan are atsimilar development stages, geographically close, andthey
also have similar technologies, labor inputs, and high savings. In both economies
the share of trade in GNP is much higher than the world average; and each economy
has been transformed from a developing economy into a high-tech oriented economy.
Moreover, both were regarded as the major phenomenon of the so-called “East Asia
miracle.” However, while Korea was at the center of the East Asian crisis, Taiwan
was much less a¤ected — even though it too has been attacked by international
speculators. Is this di¤erence an accident?
In this section we present brief overviews of the Korean and Taiwanese economies
to illustrate that their …nancial institutions are quite di¤erent, and to show how this
di¤erence may related to their di¤erent performances in the East Asia …nancial crisis.
It is well documented that Korean development has been characterized by the es-
tablishment of large conglomerates (chaebols) through government-coordinated bank
loans. In a typical case, …nancing decisions for projects in Korea are made by the
government or by the principal bank among a group of investing banks. For example,
in the 1970s the Korean government promoted investment in the heavy and chemi-
cal industries by selecting projects and providing subsidized loans. In the 1980s the
government promoted specialization in the largest chaebols through a similar …nanc-
ing approach. In the two decades since the early 1970s, more than half of Korean
domestic credits were distributed as government policy loans with low rates (Stern
et al., 1995; Cho and Kim, 1995).2 It is well documented that the decision making
of policy loans was concentrated in the hands of the government.
2A closely related fact is that since the 1970s Korean …rms were over-leveraged as their average
debt-equity ratio was among the highest in the world (Borensztein and Lee, 1998; Lee, 1998). Before
the outbreak of the 1997 crisis the average debt-equity ratio of the thirty top chaebols was about
4.5. Moreover, a recent econometric study shows that a signi…cant part of the total credit in Korea
was not used productively (Demetriades and Fattouh, 1998).
6The subsidized government loans led to distortions in the corporate capital struc-
ture: between 1965 and 1970, as the debt-equity ratio of manufacturing …rms in
Korea increased from 0.94 to 3.29 (Nam and Kim, 1994). To reform the ine¢cient
loan allocation scheme, the Korean government established a credit control system
called a “principal-transactions-bank system” in the mid-1970s. Under this system,
the bank which was most involved …nancially with each chaebol was designated as
the principal-transactions bank to coordinate all lending activities. Any new credit
to be issued by a bank to the chaebol was supposed to be evaluated by the principal
bank. However, this principal-transactions-bank system was not substantially di¤er-
ent from the government-coordinated …nancing scheme. That is, …nancing decisions
were concentrated in either the government or the principal bank.
Although there were complaints that with a predominance of government coor-
dinated bank …nancing, credits were not allocated e¢ciently to Korean …rms,3 the
great success in the period from the 1960s to the mid 1990s was obvious. Problems
in the corporate …nancing structure only became evident to outsiders when the East
Asian …nancial crisis hit Korea. Some Korean economists claimed that excessive
credit expansions caused the insolvency of 5 the top 30 and of 7 of the top 50 chae-
bols; it has been documented that the insolvent chaebols had debt-equity ratios from
5.14 to 36, while the average of the 30 top chaebols was about 4.49 in April 1997
(Park, 1997, p.1). It follows to question why creditors would be willing to continue
providing credit to insolvent or nearly insolvent chaebols? Closely related to the
high debt …nancing is the fact that there was almost no bankruptcy in Korea before
1997 (particularly for the chaebols).
3Using panel data of thirty-two Korean manufacturing sectors for the period from 1969 to 1996,
Borensztein and Lee (1998) show that credit was allocated preferentially to sectors with larger …rms,
with exports, or with poor economic performance. Examining …rm-level data for the 1984 - 86
period, Dailami and Kim (1994) discover that subsidized credit encouraged the chaebols to hold
more …nancial assets and real estate investments, but not actual productive assets.
7Major Insolvent Chaebols
Hanbo Usong Sammi Jinro Taenong Kia
Asset Ranking 14 27 26 19 33 8
Debt/Equity 6.75 17.1 32.3 36.0 18.2 5.14
Source: Kyong-so Park (1997), p.1.4
Systematic evidence indeed suggests that the closing down of Korean plants was
not related to …nancial discipline. From panel data of more than 40,000 Korean
manufacturing plants for the 1983 - 1993 period, Aw, Chung, and Roberts (1998)
discover that the productivity of the plants being closed down was about the same as
those in operation. This suggests that decisions involving the closure of plants were
not related to e¢ciency considerations.
Compared with Korea, Taiwan …rms relied on much more diversi…ed …nancial
sources. Creditors in Taiwan were not coordinated by the government or other
agents (a Japanese type of main-bank system does not exist in Taiwan). Even the
state-owned banks were supposed to make …nancing decisions on their own. In addi-
tion, equity …nancing played a much larger role in Taiwan – the average debt-equity
ratio of all Taiwan …rms during the 1985 - 1992 period was about 1.4 and the ratio
of the large …rms was even lower (about 1.2) (Semkow, 1994, p.84).
Moreover, …rms in Taiwan were subject to e¤ective …nancial discipline and thus
there had been frequent bankruptcies in the corporate sector over the past several
decades. Ine¢cient …rms were indeed disciplined: the productivity of closed-down
(disciplined) …rms was 11.4 percent to 15.5 percent lower than that of other …rms
(Aw et al., 1998).
We believe that the di¤erent …nancial structures in the two economies provide
4Closely connected to the ine¢ciencies of the projects being invested in, the losses from projects
…nanced by bank loans caused serious problems for the Korean banks. At the end of 1986, nonper-
forming loans at the …ve largest commercial banks amounted to three times the total net worth of
those banks (Park and Kim, 1994). To relieve the troubled banks, between 1985 and 1987 the Bank
of Korea provided them with more than 3 trillion won in subsidized loans (Nam, 1994).
8important clues to explain their di¤erent performances in the East Asian …nancial
crisis. In the remainder of the paper, we will attempt to explain how corporate …nanc-
ing determines the …nancial discipline of …rms, and how this is related to …nancial
stability.
3. THE MODEL
3.1 The Basic Setup
We consider a one-good economy, which has many entrepreneurs, M banks and
bank managers, and N £ M depositors. Since entrepreneurs have ideas about new
investment projects but no wealth to …nance them, a project can be …nanced either
by one bank alone or by two (or more banks) jointly. In this model any uncertain
investment can be a project, such as an investment in technological innovation or
imitation. Among all the projects proposed by entrepreneurs, ¸o percentage of the
projects are of a good type, and the rest are of a bad type. Ex ante, neither
entrepreneurs nor banks know which projects are good and which projects are bad,
but they both are fully aware of the probability of the distribution of the projects.
A project takes three periods to …nish, requiring a total investment of I = I1 +
I2 +I3, where It is the required investment in period t, and It À 1: The technology
of the project has a constant return to scale. A good project generates an ex-ante
pro…table return, Y > I, while a bad project generates no return as it stands.
For a project being …nanced, we assume that at date 1 an entrepreneur will learn
its type, while the bank(s) still will not know its type. However, at date 2, the
bank(s) will know the type of the project. If the project is of a bad type, it can be
reorganized at date 2 and the best return a reorganized bad project can generate is
X, and I3 < X < I2 + I3, that is, it is ex-ante unpro…table but ex-post pro…table.
Therefore, at date 2 a decision has to be made by the bank(s) regarding a bad project:
either to reorganize it or to liquidate it.5
5The setup of our model shares some features with Qian and Xu (1998), which is based on
9With respect to reorganization, we assume that there are two strategies a and b to
reorganize a bad project during the third period, but only one of them can generate
a pro…t ex post. The selection by the bank(s) of a speci…c strategy depends on their
information. We suppose that in the case of co-…nancing, banks A and B will observe
di¤erent information, represented by signals sA and sB respectively, where sJ 2 [s;s],
s < s and J = A, B, after I3 is invested.
We suppose that an entrepreneur gets a private bene…t bt from working on a project,
where t denotes the date when the project is either completed or terminated at
t = 1;2;3.6 Speci…cally, at date 1 if the entrepreneur quits the project, he gets a
low private bene…t, b1 > 0. At date 2, if a bad project is liquidated, the entrepreneur
gets an even lower private bene…t b2b, where 0 · b2b < b1. At date 3, if a bad
project is reorganized and completed, it will generate a private bene…t b3b > b1 to
the entrepreneur; in the case of a good project, it will generate a private bene…t,
b3g > b3b, to the entrepreneur. To summarize, we have b3g > b3b > b1 > b2b ¸ 0.
In this economy, banks exist because they create liquidity and monitor investments
on behalf of small depositors (Diamond, 1984; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990).7 Bank
managers are hired to manage banks, to make investment decisions, and to moni-
tor bank investments in …rms. They are risk-neutral, and they do not want to be
identi…ed as bad managers (e.g., career concerns).
All the M banks in the economy are ex-ante identical. Each bank has N depositors,
and according to banking regulation rules each bank has K > 0 initial bank capital,
the role of which will become clearer later. Each depositor deposits $1 in a bank,
thus each bank’s asset is $(N + K). The M banks form an interbank market to
trade liquidity. We assume that the liquidation of a bad project is observable by all
the banks; while without liquidation the nature of a project …nanced by a bank is
the Dewatripont-Maskin contractual foundation, but this paper establishes a di¤erent contractual
foundation for the commitment problem.
6We use the term private bene…t in a general way such that it includes both rewards and penalties.
7See Bhatacharya and Thakor (1993) for an excellent survey of the recent literature on contem-
porary banking theory.
10not observable by any bank that is not involved in the investment and monitoring of
the project.
In our economy there are two types of risk-averse depositors, as described by Di-
amond and Dybvig (1983): early consumers only consuming at t = 1, and late
consumers only consuming at t = 3. Ex ante, all depositors are identical and do not
become aware of their types until t = 1. Moreover, each depositor’s $1 endowment
can be stored from one period to the next, without any cost, or it can be deposited
in a bank that may generate a positive return R at date 3.8 They make their invest-
ment decision based on an ex-ante belief about the riskiness of the banking system
and about the market equilibrium returns on deposits. They supposedly do not have
the required expertise to be entrepreneurs or bank managers, nor do they monitor
banks because of high surveillance costs or/and lack of knowledge.
Each depositor’s preference is de…ned as
U = ¼1u(C1) + ½¼2u(C2);
where Cj is the consumption of type j depositor; j = 1 being early consumers who
consume at t = 1 and j = 2 being late consumers who consume at t = 3; ¼j is the
probability of a depositor being a type 1 or type 2 consumer, and ¼1+¼2 = 1; ½ < 1 is
the discount factor and ½(R + 1) > 1; and u
0
> 0, u
00
< 0, and (Cu
0
)
0
= u
0
+Cu
00
< 0.
Now we summarize the timing of the game as follows:
² Date 0: All parties know the probability of the distribution of the projects and
the depositors, but no one knows the type of each project and the type of each
depositor. The bank(s) o¤er a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the entrepreneur.
If the contract is signed, the bank(s) will invest I1 units of money into the
project during period 1. Each depositor makes a savings decision with a bank.
8Note that unlike the Diamond and Dybvig model, which has a positive and deterministic return,
in our model the return is stochastic, with an expected positive value. Bank capital K in our model
provides provisional funds for depositors in case the return from a bank’s investment is below the ex
ante expectation.
11² Date 1: The entrepreneur learns the type of the project, and may stop the
project in the case of a bad project. In such a case the entrepreneur gets a
private bene…t b1 > 0 and all the banks observe the liquidation of the project.
However, unless a project is stopped by the entrepreneur the bank(s) still does
(do) not know the type of the project and further I2 units of money are invested.
Moreover, the bank(s) will know the probability of the distribution of their own
projects better than other banks. Early consumers withdraw money from the
banks, late consumers make decisions whether to withdraw or to keep deposits
in the banks. A bank facing excessive early withdrawals has to decide whether
to borrow from the interbank market or to face a bank run.
² Date 2: The type of a project becomes public knowledge:
– If a project is of a good type, a further I3 will be invested.
– If it is a bad project, a decision whether to liquidate or to reorganize has
to be made.
¤ If a project is liquidated the bank(s) gets zero and the entrepreneur
gets b2b < b1; otherwise,
¤ if a project is reorganized, I3 will be invested.
² After investing I3, signals sA and sB are observed by the investor(s) and a
reorganization strategy is chosen based on the signals.
² Date 3: All projects are completed,
– for a good project, return Y goes to the bank(s), the entrepreneur gets
b3b > b1;
– for a bad project, return X goes to the bank(s), the entrepreneur gets
b3g > b3b;
– late consumers collect their rewards.
123.2 Financial Institutions and Information Distributions
In this section we explain how …nancial institutions can cause informational prob-
lems in an interbank market. In particular, why is there a severe information asym-
metry among banks trading in the interbank market if every project is …nanced by
a single bank alone, but the informational problem is not serious if every project is
jointly …nanced by two or more banks? For more detailed technical results and their
proofs, see Huang and Xu (1999).
Under single-bank …nancing, given that the earlier investments are sunk, the bank
will choose an ex-post e¢cient strategy to reorganize the project such that the payo¤
is greater than the ex-post cost of re…nancing, I3. As a result, the bank is unable to
commit to terminating a bad project ex post.
Moreover, the fact that the bank is not able to commit to terminating a bad
project a¤ects the entrepreneur’s ex-ante incentives to reveal information. When the
entrepreneur at date 1 discovers that his project is a bad one, he anticipates that the
project will still be continued and re…nanced by the bank at date 2 as long as it lasts
until then. Consequently, if he decides to quit the project, he gets private bene…t b1;
if he decides to continue the project, the bad project will always be re…nanced by the
bank and will generate a private bene…t b3b > b1 to the entrepreneur. Therefore, the
entrepreneur will always choose to continue a bad project after he privately discovers
its type. This implies that in an economy where every project is …nanced by one
bank, the information to separate the good projects from the bad projects is available
neither to the …nancier nor to the interbank market at date 1.
However, in the case of multi-bank …nancing, the asymmetric information and con-
‡icts of interest among the co-…nanciers related to reorganizing the project incur a
cost, F, for ex-post negotiations. When this cost, F, is high, the gain from reorgani-
zation is less than the total costs, i.e., X < I3 + F. Therefore reorganization is not
worthwhile and liquidation will follow.9
9This is a reduced form of Huang and Xu (1999). It can also be derived from a variation of some
13The commitment to liquidate a bad project at date 2 has a deterrent e¤ect on
an entrepreneur who has a bad project. Fearing further losses of his private bene…t
later, an entrepreneur will choose to quit a bad project as soon as he discovers it is
bad. Assuming the observability of liquidation, this result implies that if all projects
in an economy are …nanced by two banks, at date 1 information is available in the
interbank market to separate the good projects from the bad projects.
The following lemma summarizes the above results.
Lemma 1 At date 1, single-bank …nancing leads to a pooling equilibrium in the in-
terbank market such that good projects cannot be distinguished from bad projects;
multi-bank …nancing leads to a separating equilibrium in the interbank market such
that good projects can be distinguished from bad projects.
To simplify our language in the above lemma, in the reminder of the paper we call
an economy under multi-bank …nancing an economy with hard-budget constraints
(HBC) and an economy under single-bank …nancing an economy with soft-budget
constraints (SBC), terms coined by Kornai (1980).
4. FINANCIAL CONTAGION AND FINANCIAL CRISES
To present our basic point in the simplest possible way, we abstract government
away from our model in this section. We will brie‡y discuss the role of government
in the concluding remarks.
4.1 Deposit Contract
In our model a market equilibrium in which all agents trade can Pareto dominate
that of autarchy; but the market equilibrium may or may not provide insurance
against liquidity shocks. The main reason of interbank market failure in our model
other models, such as Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Hart and Moore (1995), and Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996).
14is that there may be information asymmetry which can give rise to contagious risks.
At date 0, consumers make a deposit decision by solving
max
(C1, C2)
U = ¼1u(C1) + ½¼2u(C2)
s.t. 1 = ¼1C1 + ¼2C2=(1+ R)
An ex-ante optimal market equilibrium can only be achieved by increasing C1 and
decreasing C2. That is, C¤
1 > 1 and C¤
2 < 1 +R.
A bank can implement a market solution through a deposit contract à la Diamond
and Dybvig. That is, for $1 deposit at t = 0, a depositor receives either C¤
1 at t = 1,
or C¤
2 at the end of the exercise. For each dollar it receives as deposit, the bank holds
¼1C¤
1 (as cash) at no extra cost, and invests the rest in illiquid technology which
yields a higher return. As banks are competitive in the economy, at C¤
1 and C¤
2 banks
on average earn zero pro…t. That is
¼1C¤
1 + (1 ¡¼1)C¤
2=(1+ R) = 1;
and after paying o¤ C¤
1 and C¤
2, the banks’ capital still remains at K. This ex-ante
optimal deposit contract is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. That is, an early
consumer always wants to consume at t = 1, but a late consumer has no incentive to
withdraw early. This is because as long as ½(1 + R) > 1, u
0
(C¤
1) = ½(1+ R)u
0
(C¤
2)
holds if C¤
1 < C¤
2, and any deviation does not pay, as long as other late consumers do
not deviate.
However, when there is no interbank market, there may be a Diamond-Dybvig
bank run equilibrium, that is, a simultaneous deviation of all late consumers from
the e¢cient equilibrium. In this case, the bank has to liquidate its project (which for
simplicity has zero value) if borrowing from the interbank market is not possible or too
expensive.10 As a result, the bank will fail and nothing will be left for late consumers
10In a separate paper (Huang and Xu, 2001) we allow banks to liquidate illiquid assets to solve
their liquidity shortage problems. See Diamond and Rajan (1998) for an analysis of liquidating
illiquid assets.
15when they withdraw later than others. Anticipating this, all late consumers will
withdraw at t = 1, and a bank run becomes self ful…lling.
In an economy with an interbank market, an illiquid bank may be able to borrow
from the market such that the Diamond-Dybvig bank-run equilibrium can be elimi-
nated all together. A key for the existence of a bank-run equilibrium is the possibility
that a bank cannot solve its liquidity shortage problem by borrowing from the inter-
bank market. This turns out to be a critical condition to retain bank-run equilibrium
when one moves from a one-bank economy to a multi-bank economy.
In our multi-bank economy the total number of depositors is …nite, with N de-
positors in each bank, and the realized numbers of type 1 and 2 depositors for each
bank are random draws from binomial distributions of ¼1 and ¼2 = 1 ¡ ¼1 respec-
tively. In the next two subsections, we will analyze …nancial contagion in MBF and
SBF economies. We start with the problem faced by the bank manager in a MBF
economy.
4.2 Bank Run in a MBF Economy
Following our results for a MBF economy, at equilibrium all bad projects are liq-
uidated at date 1, which is observable by all banks in the interbank market, and
only good projects are continued. The ex-ante expected deposit return in such an
economy is:
RM =
¸Y ¡ [I1 + ¸o(I2 + I3)]
I1 +¸o(I2 + I3)
> 0:
To meet an expected number of early withdrawals a bank’s optimal investment de-
cision is to store cash in the amount of N¼1C¤
1 , and to invest all the rest — in
the amount of N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤
1) — into a project. Every bank co-invests with another
bank in one project; given the symmetry of the banks, the investment is made in the
following way,
N(1 ¡ ¼1C¤
1) =
1
2
[I1 + ¸o(I2 +I3)]:
In the event that a project is a bad one and aborted at date 1, the realized value
16from the investment is zero. In this case, if there are more than ¼1N +
¸o(I2+I3)
C¤
1
depositors trying to withdraw at date 1, the bank will run out of cash because of
the excessive demand for withdrawals. Because it is known that this bank has a bad
project and will not be able to pay back its loan, no other bank will be willing to
lend to it. Thus a bank run can occur in a MBF economy, when a bank is hit by
both technological shocks and liquidity shocks.11
Now let us look at the case where a bank has a good project. Following our results
for a MBF, at equilibrium only good projects are continued at date one. Thus it is
a public knowledge in the interbank market that a bank is continuing a good project
and this will de…nitely generate a return of
RM
g =
Y ¡ (I1 + I2 +I3)
I1 + I2 +I3
> RM:
In this case, when such a bank faces excess early withdrawals, it will have no di¢-
culties in borrowing from other banks.12 Therefore, a bank with a good project can
solve its liquidity shortage problem by borrowing from other banks and a bank run
11If late consumers can observe the liquidation of bad projects, it is certain that a bank run will
occur after the bank’s project is liquidated.
For the sake of simplicity, we do not allow the bank with a bad project to start another project at
date 1. Moreover, this setup avoids giving a MBF economy too great of an advantage over a SBF
economy, which would also divert the focus in our analysis.
12The bank can issue a risk-free bond to borrow from other banks. The bond has a face value
of $1 and is sold at price p per share. p is determined by the competitive bank lending market. At
equilibrium R
H
g ¸ 1=p and there is su¢cient demand for such a bond.
From the supply side, since each bank stores N¼1C
¤
1 amount of cash, there is enough supply of
liquidity to meet the total amount of withdrawals of MN¼1C
¤
1 as long as there is no bank run.
Moreover, as some banks will have excess liquidity generated from the termination of bad projects,
the liquidity supply in the interbank market is adequate. Indeed, banks can improve their ex ante
liquidity management because of the excess liquidity available due to the termination of bad projects.
Huang and Xu (2001) provide further analysis of the liquidity management of banks and of liquidity
equilibrium in an interbank market.
Furthermore, because C
¤
1 < C
¤
2, it is not worthwhile for any late consumers to withdraw deposits
earlier (at date 1).
17is avoided.
Proposition 1 In a MBF economy, with symmetric information among banks, a
bank run only occurs when a bank faces both technological and liquidity shocks, but a
bank-run contagion is not possible.
The last point in the above proposition is more interesting. A MBF economy does
not experience a contagious bank run simply because with symmetric information
among banks, the interbank lending market is able to provide liquidity to all illiquid
but solvent banks, i.e., the banks that are not hit by technological shocks. As a result,
although there are still possible isolated bank runs in a MBF economy, a bank-run
contagion does not occur.
4.3 Bank Run in a SBF Economy
Following the result of Lemma 1, in a SBF economy at date 1 there is a pooling
equilibrium in the interbank market such that good projects cannot be distinguished
from bad projects. Although no information about the projects is revealed in the
market, we assume that after one period of …nancing and project monitoring, every
bank has a better understanding of the probability distribution of its own project.
That is, at date 1, the manager of bank m (m = 1;:::;M) has better information
than at date 0, such that she knows that the probability of her project is a good one
is ¸m. But this is her private information. Suppose that the qualities of all banks
can be ranked as ¸1 < ¸2 < ¸3 < ::: < ¸M, which is not known by any bank manager,
but the average quality of banks, ¸ = 1
M
PM
m=1 ¸m, is known to all banks; moreover,
¹ ¸ = ¸o, the prior knowledge of the project quality, based on which the ex ante deposit
contract is written. We assume that K > 0 is enough to provide su¢cient provisional
funds even for the bank with the lowest quality ¸1 > 0.
Given that all projects are to be completed regardless of their quality in a SBF
18economy, the ex-ante expected deposit return in such an economy is:
RS =
¸oY + (1¡ ¸o)X
I
¡ 1 > 0:
Obviously we have RS < RM.
Anticipating the expected number of early consumers’ withdrawals at date 1, a
bank’s optimal investment decision is to hold N¼1C¤
1 in cash and invest N(1¡¼1C¤
1).
That is, the expected investment of a bank is N(1¡ ¼1C¤
1) = I. Thus,
C¤
1 =
N ¡ I
N¼1
: (1)
Substituting N = N¼1C¤
1 + N(1 ¡¼1)C¤
2=(1 + R) in the above condition, we have
C¤
2 =
¸oY + (1¡ ¸o)X
N(1¡ ¼1)
: (2)
Here, (C¤
1;C¤
2) are the date 0 contract between a bank and its depositors.
Therefore, if the number of depositors who withdraw at date 1 is no more than the
expected number ¼1N, the bank will have enough cash to handle the withdrawals;
if the number of early withdrawals is more than ¼1N, however, the bank will have
to borrow from the interbank market to meet the depositors’ demands. We suppose
illiquid banks will borrow by issuing bonds.
We assume that a borrower has limited liability. That is, an illiquid borrowing
bank repays its borrowing only when it ends up with a good project. However,
given that the market knows only ¸; all illiquid banks will be treated in the same
way when they borrow. Therefore, all bonds issued by borrowing banks have the
following structure: contingent on the realization of the project at date 3, the bond
pays, 8
<
:
1; if the project is good,
0; otherwise.
To highlight our points, we assume that there is a Bertrand competition among all
lending banks such that these banks break even in lending. Hence, given the lenders’
belief that the probability that a bank will pay back 1 is ¹ ¸; the equilibrium bond
price is pS = ¹ ¸.
19For an illiquid bank to deal with n excessive early withdrawal consumers for an
amount of nC¤
1, a total of
nC¤
1
¹ ¸ shares of bonds should be issued. While the bond
structure and expected payo¤ is the same for all lenders, with the private informa-
tion about the quality of each bank’s project, the borrowing cost for each bank is
di¤erent. For bank m, with a probability of being able to repay the bond as ¸m,
the expected cost of raising liquidity to deal with n excessive early withdrawals is
¸m
nC¤
1
¹ ¸ . Therefore, the higher the quality of a bank, or the higher the ratio ¸m
¸ ;
the higher the borrowing cost for bank m. Not surprisingly, only when the ratio
¸m
¸ is not too high and ¹ ¸ is not too low the expected pro…t of illiquid bank m is
non negative when it solves its liquidity problem through borrowing. Noting that
C¤
2=C¤
1 = ¼1
1¡¼1
¸oY +(1¡¸o)X
N¡I , we have the following results.
Lemma 2 With borrowing in the interbank market,
1. a moderate bank with 1 · ¸m
¸ · C¤
2=C¤
1 maintains a non-negative pro…t after
borrowing from the interbank market to meet excess early withdrawals;
2. a bad bank with ¸m
¸ < 1 maintains a non-negative pro…t after borrowing from
the interbank market to meet excess early withdrawals if the number of excess
withdrawals is not too small such that n > b nm, which is de…ned in the proof;
and
3. a good bank with ¸m
¸ > C¤
2=C¤
1 maintains a non-negative pro…t if the total
number of excess withdrawals nm is small enough such that nm < nm, which is
de…ned in the proof.
Proof. A bank’s non-negative expected return condition is
E (R) = K +(1 ¡¸m)X +¸mY ¡[(1¡ ¼1)N ¡ n]C¤
2 ¡ ¸m
nC¤
1
¹ ¸
¸ K: (3)
In the following we look at three di¤erent cases.
20First, if 1 · ¸m
¸ · C¤
2=C¤
1 = ¼1
1¡¼1
¸oY +(1¡¸o)X
N¡I , we have n
³
C¤
2 ¡ ¸m
¸ C¤
1
´
¸ 0 for
any n > 0. Then E (R) > K always holds because
(1¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ (1¡ ¼1)NC¤
2 ¸ 0
holds for ¸m ¸ ¹ ¸.
Second, if ¸m
¸ < 1, we have n
³
C¤
2 ¡ ¸m
¸ C¤
1
´
> 0, but
(1¡ ¸m)X + ¸mY ¡ (1¡ ¼1)NC¤
2 =
¡
¸m ¡ ¹ ¸
¢
(Y ¡X) < 0;
because ¸m < ¹ ¸. Thus E (R) ¸ K holds if
nm
µ
C¤
2 ¡
¸m
¸
C¤
1
¶
>
¡¹ ¸ ¡ ¸m
¢
(Y ¡ X):
That is,
nm > b nm ´
¡¹ ¸ ¡ ¸m
¢
(Y ¡ X)
³
C¤
2 ¡ ¸m
¸ C¤
1
´ =
¡¹ ¸ ¡ ¸m
¢
¼1(1 ¡¼1)N (Y ¡ X)
¼1[¸oY +(1 ¡¸o)X] ¡ ¸m
¸ (1¡ ¼1)(N ¡I)
(4)
Finally, if ¸m
¸ > C¤
2=C¤
1, E (R) > K if and only if
(1 ¡¸m)X +¸mY ¡(1 ¡¼1)NC¤
2 =
¡
¸m ¡ ¹ ¸
¢
(Y ¡ X) > nm
·
¸m
¹ ¸
C¤
1 ¡C¤
2
¸
:
That is,
nm < nm ´
¡
¸m ¡ ¹ ¸
¢
¼1(1¡ ¼1)N (Y ¡ X)
¸m
¸ (1 ¡ ¼1)(N ¡ I) ¡ ¼1 [¸oY + (1¡ ¸o)X]
: (5)
The intuition behind this lemma is clear. In a lemon interbank market, a good
bank with ¸m > ¹ ¸ borrowing is equivalent to providing subsidies to bad banks with
¸m · ¹ ¸; and the better a bank is the more subsidies it provides. In the …rst case,
for a moderate bank the project is good enough to have a positive expected net
return and the subsidy provided to others is not much, thus borrowing from the
interbank market will not be a problem. In the second case, a bad bank bene…ts not
only because it receives subsidies through borrowing from the interbank market but
also it substitutes date 3 payment C¤
2 by a low date 1 payment C¤
1 to depositors.
21Thus, when the number of early withdrawals is large enough, nm > b nm, a bad bank
will be able to make an expected positive payo¤ by borrowing. However, in the last
case, for a good bank only when the number of early withdrawals is not too large,
i.e. nm < nm, the need to borrow is low and the costs of subsiding others will be
a¤ordable such that the expected payo¤ is not negative.
Notice that if ¸m refers to the best bank, the ratio ¸m
¸o , a measure of the hetero-
geneity of the project pool in the economy, can also be interpreted as a measure of
the degree of information asymmetry in the interbank market. A perfectly homoge-
neous case is one where for every bank m, ¸m = ¸o = ¹ ¸ . Applying Lemma 2, when
the banks in the economy are perfectly homogeneous, every bank in the economy
satis…es the condition 1 · ¸m
¸ < C¤
2=C¤
1 so that it maintains a non-negative pro…t
after borrowing to meet excess early withdrawals.
Corollary 1 If ¸m = ¹ ¸ = ¸o, then every bank is willing to borrow from the interbank
market to meet excess early withdrawals and there is no bank run at equilibrium.
In the following we have comparative static results about nm and b nm.
Lemma 3 @nm=@¸m < 0 but @nm=@¹ ¸ > 0; @b nm=@¸m < 0 but @b nm=@¹ ¸ > 0.
Proof. Because C¤
1 ¡C¤
2 < 0, that is
(1¡ ¼1)(N ¡ I)¡ ¼1 [¸oY + (1¡ ¸o)X] < 0;
we have
@nm
@¸m
=
@
@¸m
¡
¸m ¡ ¹ ¸
¢
¼1(1¡ ¼1)N (Y ¡ X)
¸m
¸ (1¡ ¼1)(N ¡ I)¡ ¼1 [¸oY + (1¡ ¸o)X]
=
[(1 ¡¼1)(N ¡ I) ¡¼1 [¸oY + (1¡ ¸o)X]][¼1(1 ¡ ¼1)N (Y ¡X)]
h
¸m
¸ (1¡ ¼1)(N ¡ I) ¡ ¼1[¸oY + (1 ¡ ¸o)X]
i2
< 0;
Moreover,
@nm
@¹ ¸
=
@
@¹ ¸
¡
¸m ¡ ¹ ¸
¢
¼1(1¡ ¼1)N (Y ¡ X)
¸m
¸ (1 ¡ ¼1)(N ¡ I) ¡ ¼1 [¸oY + (1¡ ¸o)X]
22=
·³
¸m
¸
´2
(1¡ ¼1)(N ¡I) + ¼1 [¸oY +(1 ¡¸o)X]
¸
[¼1(1 ¡ ¼1)N (Y ¡X)]
h
¸m
¸ (1¡ ¼1)(N ¡ I) ¡ ¼1[¸oY + (1 ¡ ¸o)X]
i2
> 0:
Similarly, we have
@b nm
@¸m
< 0 <
@b nm
@¹ ¸
;
because the algebraic expressions for b nm and nm are the same.
The intuition of the …rst result is the following. Better banks subsidize the bor-
rowing of bad banks from the interbank market, moreover, the better the quality of
the bank is and the more the bank borrows, the more subsidies it pays. As a result,
everything being equal, the better a bank’s quality, the smaller number of excess
early withdrawals the bank is willing to deal with by borrowing. The second result
implies that when the average quality of all borrowing banks is lower, the number of
excess early withdrawals that a good bank is willing to deal with through borrow-
ing declines. This result will be important when we analyze contagious risks in the
interbank market.
It is interesting to note that mathematically comparative static expressions for bad
banks are the same as those for good banks. But the interpretations should be as
follows. The worse a bad bank is, the larger the number of excess early withdrawals it
needs to make its expected payo¤ positive through borrowing. Moreover, the higher
the average quality of illiquid banks, the larger the number of excess early withdrawals
an illiquid bad bank will need.
In the following we will analyze a bank-run equilibrium in a SBF economy. To
simplify analysis, we suppose that a bank manager has an incentive to avoid being
identi…ed as a poor manager. We also assume that a bank that loses its capital, and
thus is unable to meet the capital adequacy requirement or is liquidated, is perceived
as an indication of bad management; while a bank run is not perceived as such since
a well-managed bank may also su¤er from a bank run. Thus, from the perspective
of a bank manager, the expectation of being unable to meet the capital adequacy
23requirement or of liquidating at date 3 is worse than a bank run at date 1. Therefore,
when a manager has to choose between facing an expected liquidation at date 3 and
a bank run at date 1, she will choose the latter.13 Given these assumptions applying
the above Lemmas, given C¤
2=C¤
1 = ¼1
1¡¼1
¸oY +(1¡¸o)X
N¡I , we have the following results.
Proposition 2 In a SBF economy
1. if banks’ projects are perfectly homogeneous, then bank runs never occur;
2. if banks’ projects are heterogeneous, then for any bank m
² if ¸m < ¹ ¸ and nm < b nm, this bank will su¤er from a bank run;
² if ¸m 2
£¹ ¸; ¹ ¸C¤
2=C¤
1
¤
, borrowing from the interbank market is always de-
sirable;
² if ¸m > ¹ ¸C¤
2=C¤
1 and nm > nm, this bank will su¤er from a bank run.
The intuition of the former is straightforward. When projects are perfectly homo-
geneous there is no information asymmetry in the interbank market even in a SBF
economy. If that is the case and the uncertainty of projects …nanced by banks is
reasonably low, the interbank market will function well and there is no bank run in a
SBF economy. In contrast, as long as projects are heterogeneous in a MBF economy
illiquid and insolvent banks may still su¤er bank runs even when the project pool
is relatively safe. That is, if one ignores heterogeneity of projects in economies, a
SBF economy may appear better than a MBF economy in terms of …nancial stability
when the project pool of the banks in the economy is less uncertain. This result sheds
some light on the ‘East Asian miracle’ which occurred before the mid 1990s when the
project pool in those economies featured less uncertain imitations.
The latter results for heterogenous projects show that a bad and illiquid bank
welcomes a large amount of excess withdrawals, which gives the bank a chance to be-
come solvent due to the implicit subsidy through borrowing. However, the interbank
13The same qualitative result can be derived without this assumption but at the cost of a more
complicated analysis.
24market will function well for banks with moderate quality projects regardless of the
number of early withdrawals. This is because these banks provide few subsidies to
others through borrowing. Finally, when the number of excess withdrawals is larger
than a critical level, good and illiquid banks will be run by their depositors. This is
because their subsidies to bad banks are so high that they become insolvent when
they borrow too much. To avoid the consequence of liquidation these bank managers
choose not to borrow. The implication of this result is harmful to the economy due
to the negative externalities of runs of good banks in the interbank market.
4.4 Bank-Run Contagion and Financial Crisis in a SBF Economy
Our analysis in the above subsection has shown that under some conditions al-
though a interbank market in a SBF economy is a lemon market, it still functions for
banks to share liquidity risks. However, when those conditions are not satis…ed, the
results can be serious. In this subsection, we analyze contagious risks in the interbank
market. In particular, we show that if bank runs occur to good quality banks, this
can lead to contagious massive bank failures, which can lead to a …nancial crisis.
The insights from Proposition 2 above reveal several interesting cases. First, if
the quality of the bank portfolio is close to perfectly homogeneous and the average
quality is not too low, then there is no bank-run contagion.
Second, if the bank portfolio quality is heterogeneous but only a small number of
excess withdrawals occur from good banks, then the interbank market should function
well and there will be no bank run.
Third, if the bank portfolio quality is heterogeneous but a large number of excess
withdrawals only occur to bad banks, there will be isolated bank runs from bad
banks only. This happens when the number of excess early withdrawals is related
the portfolio quality of the bank. That is, bank runs are information-based as in
Postlewaite and Vives (1987) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), who suggest
that depositors can have imperfect monitoring of bank assets.
25Fourth, if the bank portfolio quality is heterogeneous and there are some large
excess early withdrawals (nm > nm) from good banks and yet an insu¢cient number
of early withdrawals from bad banks, the banking system may also be subject to a
contagious bank run.14 The insight from this case can be seen more clearly as our
analysis proceeds.
For simplicity, we assume that the liquidity shock is exogenously given such that
there are w illiquid good, moderate, and bad banks that face the same amount, b n, of
excess early withdrawals. The average quality of all illiquid banks is
¸w =
1
w
w X
i=1
¸i:
We also continue to assume that the average quality ¸w is known by all banks, but
each individual bank’s ¸i is not known by other banks.
To facilitate our analysis, we group the w banks into three partitions, good (Wg),
ugly (Wu), and bad (Wb), such that ¸wb+1 = ¹ ¸w, and ¸wu = ¹ ¸w
C¤
2
C¤
1 . The relationship
between the ranking of the banks and the partition is illustrated in the following.
¸1 < ¸2 < ::: < ¸wb | {z }
< ¸wb+1 < :::::: < ¸wu | {z }
< ¸wg < :::::: < ¸w | {z }
Wb: b nwb > b n Wu Wg: nwg < b n
Obviously, in partition Wb, a bank has a subscript i that 1 · i · wb and ¸wb < ¸w;
while in partition Wu, a bank has a subscript i that 1+wb · i · wu, ¸wb+1 ¸ ¸w and
¸wu · (C¤
2=C¤
1)¸w; …nally, in partition Wg, a bank has a subscript i that wg < i · w,
where wg = wu + 1, and ¸wu+1 > (C¤
2=C¤
1)¸w.
Depending on the magnitude of exogenous shock b n there are three possible cases:
case one – b n > b nwb > nwg; case two – b nwb > b n > nwg; and case three – b nwb > nwg > b n,
where b nwb = b n(¸wb) and nwg = n
¡
¸wg
¢
are determined by applications of Lemma 2.
Let us start with the …rst case of b n > b nwb > nwg.
Given @ni=@¸i < 0 (Lemma 3) and b n > nwg, applying Proposition 2 all banks in
the Wg partition decide not to borrow from the interbank market and su¤er from
14This can happen either when depositors’ monitoring is more blurred than that of the bank
managers’ or when depositors at a good quality bank face a stronger liquidity shock than others.
26bank runs. Applying the same proposition, banks in the Wu and Wb partitions would
choose to borrow in the interbank market todeal with the excessive early withdrawals.
However, the decision of the Wg banks not to borrow generates externalities in the
interbank market so that the average quality of borrowing banks is lowered. The
average quality of the remaining illiquid banks to borrow from the interbank market,
¹ ¸wu, will decrease to
¹ ¸wu =
1
wu
wu X
i=1
¸i < ¹ ¸w:
This also lowers the critical value (C¤
2=C¤
1)¸wu.
With a lowered ¹ ¸wu, some better Wu banks may have higher ¸ than the new
threshold value (C¤
2=C¤
1)¸wu; similarly, some less bad Wb banks may become better
than the new average ¹ ¸wu. Under the lowered average quality, the partition of the
remaining borrowing-banks in the interbank market is the following: for partition
Wbb, ¸wbb < ¸wu; for partition Wub, ¸bb+1 ¸ ¸wu and ¸wub · (C¤
2=C¤
1)¸wu; …nally, for
partition Wug, ¸wub+1 > (C¤
2=C¤
1)¸wu The partitions are illustrated as follows.
¸1 < ¸2 < ::: < ¸wbb | {z }
< ¸wbb+1 < :::::: < ¸wub | {z }
< ¸wub+1 < :::::: < ¸wu | {z }
Wbb Wub Wug
Applying Lemma 3, with a lowered ¹ ¸wu, ¹ nwug and b nwbb are also lowered so that
the condition b n > b nwbb > nwug is satis…ed. Given these conditions, the logic repeats
that Wug banks decide not to borrow and thus they encounter bank runs. As a
result, the average quality of the remaining illiquid banks, the banks in partitions Wbb
and Wub, will be further lowered. This in turn will further increase the borrowing
cost. The same process repeats such that there will be additional bank runs, further
deterioration of the quality of banks, and a further lowering of bond prices until they
reach such a low level that no bank is willing to borrow at the interbank market rate.
We regard this result as a bank-run contagion or …nancial crisis.
Now we analyze the second case where b nwb > b n > nwg. In this case, the behavior
of banks in partitions Wg and Wu are the same as in the …rst case. However, the
amount of excess early withdrawals faced by the banks in partition Wb is not so large
27that after paying the early withdrawals through (implicitly subsidized) borrowing
they still incur losses. Given the assumption that b n is the same for all the illiquid
banks and ¹ ¸w is public knowledge, the bad banks will anticipate that the good illiquid
banks may face bank runs. As a result, the number of early withdrawals may increase
dramatically. With this expectation, banks in partition Wb will choose to borrow in
the interbank market so as to wait until there are a large enough number of early
withdrawals to turn their losses into pro…ts.
Following a similar analysis to case one, when banks in partition Wg pull out
from the interbank borrowing, the average quality of the borrowers interbank market
deteriorates. This may cause some banks in partition Wu also not to borrow while
the worst banks in partition Wb are still better o¤ from borrowing. Repeating this
logic, similar to case one, the economy may end up with a bank-run contagion and
…nancial crisis.
Finally, we analyze the last case where the number of excessive early withdrawals
is small, i.e., b nwb > nwg > b n. In this case, all illiquid banks in partitions Wg and
Wu will borrow in the interbank market to deal with the excessive early withdrawals.
However, all banks in partition Wb will not borrow and thus will encounter bank
runs. But these are isolated bank runs, i.e., there is no contagion and no …nancial
crisis.
The above three cases can be condensed into two cases: the case of b n > b nwg and
the case of b n · b nwg.
Proposition 3 In a SBF economy,
1. if the economy-wide bank portfolio quality is highly homogeneous and the average
quality is not too low, there is no bank run;
2. if the economy-wide bank portfolio quality is highly heterogeneous and
² the number of excess withdrawals is large enough such that b n > b nwg, the
banking system faces a contagious bank run; however, if
28² b n · b nwg, there only will be bank runs to bad banks and there will be no
bank-run contagion.
These results shed light on the timing of the East Asian …nancial crisis, in particu-
lar, on why Korea was hit by the crisis and why the Japanese economy stagnated since
the 1980s. In the early 1990s (the 1980s for Japan), the Korean economy became
more developed, moving onto technological frontiers and investing more in high-tech
projects and in innovations; its project pool became more uncertain and more het-
erogeneous. Thus the Korean economy began to meet the conditions for a bank-run
contagion and could face a …nancial crisis if some liquidity shocks were to hit the
economy.15
In sharp contrast, in a MBF economy information about bank investment quality is
revealed to all banks at date 1 because of the liquidation of bad projects. As a result
of the symmetric information, bank runs are always restricted to insolvent banks and
the interbank market never degenerates. Therefore, a bank-run contagion will never
occur when there are only idiosyncratic shocks!
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper endogenizes contagious risks and …nancial crises from the perspective
of …nancial institutions and corporate …nance. We began our analysis by examining
informational problems not only between entrepreneurs and banks but also in the
interbank market. Then we showed how in a SBF economy the information asym-
metry between entrepreneurs and banks leads to a “lemon” problem in the interbank
lending market, which further impedes strong banks from securing loans to solve liq-
uidity shortage problems when they face liquidity shocks. Therefore, bank runs may
break out, thus further exacerbating the lemon problem and possibly leading to a
collapse of the entire banking system. In contrast, under a MBF economy entrepre-
15Radelet and Sachs (1998) provide detailed accounts of the “bank-run” contagion during the East
Asian …nancial crisis.
29neurs reveal their private information to the banks in a timely fashion. As a result
information about the quality of the banks is disclosed also to the whole banking
system in a timely fashion. This allows the interbank lending markets to function
well in providing loans to illiquid but solvent banks. Thus, solvent banks will be
rescued and …nancial crisis will be avoided.
Our theory helps to reconcile the seemingly paradoxical phenomena between the
“East Asian miracle” during the three decades prior to 1997 and the East Asian
…nancial crisis in the period after 1997. During the period of early development, that
is, the catching-up period of the 1960s to the early 1990s, the uncertainty of projects
was low due to the nature of technological imitation. In this situation, our theory
predicts that in a SBF economy there are no project liquidations and no bank runs.
That is, a SBF economy appears even to outperform a MBF economy, and it may
attract many investments. However, if the uncertainty of projects rises precipitously,
for example, when an economy moves on to technological frontiers (e.g., South Korea
since the early 1990s), the negative e¤ects of a SBF economy will dominate, …nally
leading to trouble in the …nancial system.
Some …nal remarks about our theory are in order. Although our theory is moti-
vated by observations of the East Asian …nancial crisis, it is a very basic model that
aims to improve our general understanding of …nancial crises. In the real world,
there may not exist a simple MBF economy such that all bad projects are liquidated
as cleanly and early as in our model. That is, even in a well-developed market
economy there exist some SBF …nancial and economic institutions which may cause
bank runs or even …nancial crises, but to a lesser degree than in an economy where
SBF predominates. However, the basic message of our theory is clear.
Moreover, in order to study …nancial crises from a purely economic perspective,
we provide an institutional foundation for soft-budget constraints where there are no
political problems and every agent maximizes his/her own economic gain. But our
theory of …nancial crises is general enough that any institutional foundation for a
soft-budget constraint economy (e.g., a foundation based on political considerations,
30Segal, 1998) applies and can produce the same qualitative results. For example, it
is well documented that there is serious corruption in some of the Asian economies,
and it is a widely held belief that corruption in those economies, particularly in the
Philippines and Thailand, and probably also in Malaysia and even Korea, had an
e¤ect on their …nancial crises. Our model also allows us to examine how corruption
a¤ects …nancial institutions and changes the likelihood of …nancial crisis.
There are two aspects of corruption that can be introduced into our model. The
…rst aspect is that corruption itself can be a mechanism of a soft-budget constraint
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). That is, when it is discovered that a project is a bad
one at date 2, …rms and …nancial institutions in a corrupt economy have the option
of bribing the government to bailout the project, even if the project is not ex post
pro…table. That is, with corruption …nancial discipline will be less e¤ective in the
economy.
In addition, another aspect of corruption can also be incorporated into our model;
that is, corruption can a¤ect the selection of projects. This aspect will signi…cantly
alter our results regarding the timing of …nancial crisis. For illustrative purposes,
we suppose that at date 0 there is asymmetric information such that entrepreneurs
know the distribution better; moreover, some risky projects may bene…t some entre-
preneurs. In a corrupt economy the entrepreneur may bribe the bank to get …nancing
for the project. Thus, on average projects selected in a corrupt economy will be riskier
than those in a corruption-free economy. Therefore, even in a less developed economy
like the Philippines and Thailand, many high risk projects may be chosen because of
corruption. As corruption not only taints …nancial discipline but also makes selection
gear towards more risky projects, Proposition 3 implies that a corrupt economy is
more likely to have a …nancial crisis.
Our theory has implications for many policy solutions proposed in the literature.
For example, Dewatripont-Tirole (1994) propose the following policies to deal with
bank failures: 1) to liquidate illiquid banks; 2) to allow solvent and liquid banks
to take over illiquid banks; and 3) to provide loans to illiquid banks. Our theory
31demonstrates that in a MBF economy, with su¢cient information about the solvency
of illiquid banks, the government should consider the trade-o¤ between closing down
illiquid banks and letting solvent liquid banks take over illiquid banks; or to provide
loans to solvent illiquid banks. However, in a SBF economy, without information
about the solvency of the banks, the government has no other choice but to provide
loans to all illiquid banks or to provide loans to a proportion of them randomly.
With respect to nationalizing illiquid banks, our theory implies that this may work
as an emergency measure if nationalization has an informational value such that with
control rights the government may be able to identify the solvent banks. However,
this may not work in the long run because a nationalized bank will likely generate a
SBF environment.
Regarding the lender of last resort (LOLR) policy,16 since the government also
faces an adverse selection problem in the sense that it does not know the solvency
of each bank at date 1, an implication of our theory is that the best that the gov-
ernment can do may be either to rescue all the banks regardless of their solvency,
thus creating a bail-out trap, or to rescue none of them, thus leaving the banking
system vulnerable to contagious risks and …nancial crises. Therefore, focusing on the
information asymmetry between the government and illiquid banks and e¤ectively
dealing with it is a key to the implementation of the LOLR policy.
Another important policy issue concerns the liberalization of …nancial markets
and institutions, whose e¤ects can be analyzed in our model by comparing a one
bank economy (before liberalization) with an M-bank economy (after liberalization).
According to our theory, a one-bank economy must be a SBF economy. Moreover,
because all the deposits in the economy are pooled in one bank, the risk of facing a
liquidity shock or a bank run will be greatly reduced. Theoretically, if the economy
has a su¢ciently large number of depositors, then the probability of excessive early
withdrawals from the bank will be negligible. That is, although ine¢cient, this one-
16See Goodhart and Huang (1998) for a LOLR model and Huang and Xu (2000) for further
discussions on contagious risks and LOLR policy.
32bank economy is almost immune to bank runs or …nancial crisis. In contrast to a
one-bank economy, an M-bank SBF economy is very sensitive toa bank-run contagion
due to the lemon problem in the interbank lending market.
This comparison has important implications for banking policies and reforms. The
basic message is that a liberalization of …nancial institutions must be conditional on
measures to harden the budget constraints. If liberalized banks are operating under a
SBF and measures to harden the budget constraints are not in place, a liberalization
policy may greatly destabilize the …nancial system!
This simple analysis captures some characteristics of banking reform and liberal-
ization. For instance, a major reform measure in the transition from a centralized
economy to a market economy is to change the banking system from a one-bank
system (at least conceptually one can regard all state banks as branches of one bank
– the state bank) into a multi-bank system. Many of the banking system liberal-
ization reforms in East Asia before 1997 shared this spirit as well. According to our
theory, a banking system reform designed to enhance competition as described above
can create huge contagious risks to the system, if additional measures to harden the
budget constraints in the system are not implemented simultaneously.
Another important policy implication from our theory for …nancial system reform
and for …nancial-crisis prevention is that the transparency of the banking system is
critical. However, transparency cannot be achieved by imposing government regula-
tions alone. In fact, if the wrong issues of transparency are targeted, a regulation may
back…re in the sense that the commitment device of the banks can be destroyed even
in a MBF economy. This is because the commitment device relies on an information
asymmetry between banks. Therefore, an e¤ective reform can only be achieved by
reforming the …nancial institutions to tighten the budget constraints at the micro
level.
Finally, our work complements the existing literature on banking and …nancial
crisis. This can be seen more clearly through by comparing our work with some
of the existing literature. Allen and Gale (2000) in the Diamond and Dybvig one-
33bank framework show that bank runs are related to the business cycle, rather than
being the results of simple “sunspots.” We are in agreement with their view in that
fundamentals a¤ect …nancial crises, and we argue that …nancial institutions are just
such a fundamental factor, especially in a multi-bank banking system. Chang and
Velasco (2001) extend the Diamond and Dybvig model to an open economy model.
They show that the illiquidity of the domestic …nancial system is at the center of a
…nancial crisis in emerging markets. We regard the Chang and Velasco model as
complementary to our theory. In fact, we can readily apply their approach to extend
our model and explain how domestic …nancial institutions interact with international
…nancial issues and how an over-borrowing syndrome in the sense of McKinnon and
Pill (1997) is generated.
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